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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAEGER AND BRANCH, INC., a
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

Case No.
10885

JIM PAPPAS dba JIM PAPPAS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent

Appeal from a Judgment against the Defendant
Granted by the Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, Honorable Leonard W. Elton,
Judge, Presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is

an action to collect $6,500.00

by an alleged holder in due course of a check
which was tendered by appellant who stopped
payment for failure of consideration.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court,
Leonard W. Elton, Judge, after plaintiff presented a prima facia case and defendant
presented his evidence, granted judgment in

favor

of plaintiff as a holder in due

course and against the defendant in the sum
of $6,500.00 with interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum from January 18, 1966 plus
costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the District Court and a decision that
as a matter of law plaintiff is not a holder
in due course of appellant's check and is not
entitled to the legal shelter arising from
that status due to the notice which plaintiff
received of a valid defense against the original
payee and respondent's failure to show that
it took for value and in good faith as required
by the Utah Commercial Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are undisputed other than
the question of whether or not the notice given
was adequate to foreclose the claim of holder
as a holder in due course.

Appellant purchased

a great number of items from one Allo Distributing Company in his construction of a lodge
in Park City, Utah) known as the C'est Bon'

Hotel. (Tr.

25-26)

The last two deliveries

were to be a large shipment of carpet (Tr.
34 and 41) and a truck load of interior furnishings.

(Tr. 29,34 and 43)

On or about

January 9, 1966, the shipment of carpeting
from Allo had been forwarded and was being
held in Ogden by United Freight Forwarding
and appellant could not get delivery.
41)

(Tr.

On January 11 or 12, 1966, appellant talked

with Allo and at Allo's request with respondent
to determine why the shipment was beine held.
(Tr. 48,49 and 73)

The carpet was released

and received on January 14, 1966.

(Tr. 60)

Appellant agreed to forward a check for the
balance of the items which were supposed to
have been shipped by Allo prior to receipt
of the check as consideration for the amount
paid.

Appellant told Allo that unless the

items were received, payment on the check would
be stopped.

(Tr. 51 and 74)

On January 12,

1966, appellant spoke by telephone at Allo's
request with respondent concerning the payment to Allo.

(Tr. 55)
-3-

The

first conver-

sation was to determine why the carpet was
being held and the second was to determine
whether they were paid in full for the materials
purchased by Allo for appellant. (Tr. 57)
Taking the testimony of defendant and
his witness most favorably to the defendant,
together with reasonable inferences therefrom,
the following testimony from conversations
between defendant and Allo Distributing Company
and between the defendant and Mrs. Voorhees
and the plaintiff's Mr. Don Moreland, should
receive careful consideration from the Court
"The reason for stopping payment on the check
on January 18, 1966, was overpayment. If

(Tr. 22)

"The check reached the Walker Bank January 22,"
(Tr. 23)

It was agreed at pre-trial that the

check was negotiated to plaintiff January 14.
(Tr. 32)

The corversations to the plaintiff

were made January 11, 1966.
8)

(Tr. 34 and Exhibit

Allo Distributing agreed to ship an addi-

tional truckload of merchandise, which truckload never arrived.

(Tr. 43) As of January

10, 1966, assuming delivery of the carpets
-4-

being held up, defendant would have owed Allo
$1,000 to $1,500.

(Tr. 48)

Plaintiff's Don Moreland was surprised
the carpeting was being held up and told defendant
"We couldn't know the carpets was being held
up.

We thought you received it. 11 and told

defendant he couldn't give information about
the account between Allo Distributing and Jaeger
and Branch, but that

11

our business with Allo

Distributing has been good" and when defendant
said 'iI assume you have been paid in full and
are real happy with the deal" Moreland answered
11

Yes, and that it was not necessary to put

Jaeger and Branch's name on the check he was
sending to Al lo.

(Tr. 5 0-51)

An earlier conversation between Defendant
and Allen Sandler of Allo Distributing made
plain that $6,000.00 to be sent was for operating cash against future purchases and that
Allo would release the carpet.

(Tr. 50)

In

that and subsequent conversations Sandler
assured defendant the truckload of merchandise would be shipped and defendant stated:
-5-

11

If you don 1 t send me every th"ing you say you

are going to do -- I have sent you a company
check -- and I will stop payment on it 11 as to
which Sandler said

11

Fine, go ahead."

(Tr. 51)

On the second conversation between
defendant and Moreland, Moreland reiterated
that Jaeger and Branch was not holding up the
carpeting and that he could not release information as to the account between Allo and
Jaeger and Branch:

11

You are dealing with Allo.

We have nothing to do with that.

11

And Moreland

told defendant he couldn't say whether Allo had
paid in full because it was against their
business ethics but "our relationship with
Allo Distributing is very good.

11

(Tr. 59)

Mrs. Voorhees told Don Moreland
11

negotiations was breaking down between Allo

Distributing Company and Jim Pappas Construction,
and we were having trouble getting our shipments and getting our releasements, and we
were afraid that we were going to end up shoved
out of our order

~·:

i;

~·:

11

that I would live up

to my end of the bargain if they would live up
to their end of the bargain -- is the way she

said it to me.

:i

(Tr. 64-65)

If the carpets had not been released
the check for $6,500.00 would have overpaid
Allo Distributiong "by $10,000.00 to $15,000.00
without the check.

(Tr. 6 6)

l;

On January 12th defendant told Allo
Distributing he was sending them a check for
$6,000.00 expecting the carpet to be released
and also the other truckload of furniture to
come up.

(Tr. 7 3)

Defendant verified what Allo Distributing told him about not owing their suppliers
"except with Mr. Moreland, he didn't know
whether they owed money or didn't owe them
money."

(Tr. 75)
Mrs.

Voorhees talked to Don Moreland

on January 11th in behalf of defendant and told
him there was some question as to whether or
not the wholesale distributors had been paid by
Allo which she was attempting to ascertain and
that other suppliers had been called with Mr.
Sandler's permission.
-7-

(Tr. 78)

Moreland asked

if they were having difficulty with Allo and
she said

1

'No, not really difficult, but Al lo

Distributing asked for more money and we just
wanted to be sure that they weren't (sic.)
maintaining their end of the contract.

In part

paid some of the money to Jaeger and Branchu.
(Tr. 79)

And again

;Well, it seems as though

1

relations have broken down between Mr. Pappas
and Allo Distributing

***

Mr. Pappas has

to this point paid somewhere in the vicinity
of $45,000.00 to these people, and we have
received very little of the goods.

a

(Tr. 81)

and upon being informed that carpeting was being
held up Mr. Moreland said
do with that".

11

We have nothing to

(Tr. 81)

Mrs. Voorhees further explained to
Moreland

1

'.that Mr. Pappas was a little fearful

that all the money that he was payine to them
-.':

.._,,

:': wasn 1 t going where they said it was going::

and Moreland said if anything further came up
along this line he would call Mrs. Voorhees.
(Tr. 81)

She told Moreland that Pappas was

going to be sending money down and before doing

so

11

he wanted to be sure that the moneys

were going in the proper places 11

•

(Tr. 8 2-8 3)

The final shipment was not received.
Payment on the check was stopped.

Allo had

transferred the check over to respondents who
did not call appellant but called the drawee
bank to see if there were funds to cover the
check.

The check was processed for payment

by respondent.

Prior to receipt by the bank,

payment was stopped.

(Tr. 21-24)

POINTS TO BE ARGUED
1.

Legal notice was given to respondent

of a valid defense.
2.

Respondent was put on notice as

to the validity of the check and the defense
to its payment.
3.

Respondent is not a holder in due

course under the terms of the Utah Commercial
Code.
ARGUMENT
This is the Court's first opportinity
to review the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code relating to the legal shelter created

by the concept of holder in due course and the

requirements of the code as to value, good
faith and notice of defense which would overcome that legal presumption.
The trial court disposed of this case
on plaintiff's Motion for Judgment at the
close of defendant's evidence, plaintiff having
presented only a prima facia case.

On this

motion and this appeal the evidence is to be
construed in favor of the defendant and all
reasonable implications arising from the
evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
defendant-appellant similar to granting of
Summary Judgment, Bridge v. Backman, 10 Ut.
2d 366, 353 P 2d 909 (1960) and Condas v.
Adams,

15 Ut. 2d 132, 388 P 2d 803 (1964)
The conversations between Mr. Pappas,

Mrs. Voorhees and Mr. Moreland charged the
respondent with notice thereof and the implication therefrom are also charged to the respondent.

The purpose of the first inquiry was

to learn whether Jaeger and Branch had been
paid.

At this point the

carpets were being

held up and the respondent is charged with

notice of the fact of the inquiry, the nature
of the inquiry and the reason for the inquiry.
Obviously, the situation between appellant
and Allo was not satisfactory and appellant
was raising a question both as to use of the
money paid to Allo and whether there was a
claim assertable against merchandise ordered
by appellant and still undelivered.
Respondent took the position on the
telephone that it had been paid, and when
pressed as to that took the position that it
was none of the appellant's business to know
of the relationship between respondent and
Allo and that appellant need not concern itself
with that fact, despite appellant's offer to
put the name of Jaeger and Branch on the
check it was sending as payment.
Upon receipt of the check it is plain
that respondent had some misgivings about it
and placed a call to the bank upon which the
check was drawn.
thing to do.

This was not a reasonable

Jaeger and Branch had given

nothing for the check, was not releasing anything, since it denied that it was holding

up the carpets and the purpose of the inquiry
would seem to be that it was trying to make
itself a holder in due course and get the
money out of the bank before appellant could
correct the situation between it and Allo
Distributing.

Since appellant had gone to the

trouble of calling respondent four times on the
telephone the only reasonable inquiry for
respondent to make when it received the check
from Allo Distributing, whom it knew to be in
financial distress, was to clear the matter
with the Appellant and make certain that the
goods to be delivered by Allo had, in fact,
been delivered and that no stop payment was to
be outstanding on the check.

The fact is,

and respondent must have been apprehensive of
that very situation, that had respondent called
appellant it would have been told that the
check was being held up until Allo performed
in accordance with their agreement, which had
been intimated in the earlier telephone
conversations between these parties.
Respondent is charged with this inform-

ation.

Appellant plainly had a defense against

Allo Distributing, the payee of the check,
and upon establishing that defense the burden
shifted to the plaintiff-respondent to show
that it was a holder in due course, which burden
the respondent did not sustain.

POINT I. LEGAL NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO RESPONDENT
OF A VALID DEFENSE.
?OA-3-302 U.C.A, 1953 as amended:
"(l) A holder in due course is a
holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overd'ue
or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person."
?OA-3-304 U.C.A., 1953 as amended:
(1) The purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense if . . .
11

(b) The purchaser has notice that the
obligation of any party is voidable
in whole or in part, or that all
parties have been discharged . . .
(6) To be effective notice must be
received at such time and in such
manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.n
The notice required is defined in 70A1-201 U.C.A., 1953 as amended:

~(27)
Notice, knowledge or a notice
or notification received by an organization is effective for a particular
transaction from the time when it is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction and
.
'
in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to his attention if
the organization had exercised due
diligence.
An organization exercises
due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person
conducting the transaction and there is
reasonable compliance with the routines.
Due diligence does not require an
individual acting for the organization
to communicate information unless such
communication is part of his regular
duties or unless he has reason to know
of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially affected
by the information. 11
1

This legal notice is such knowledge
to the respondent that Allo had not fulfilled
its contract.

Both appellant and Mrs. Voorhees

disclosed to respondent that the delivery of
carpets was being held up and that the final
truckload of items had not been received.
Both indicated to respondent that payment was
requested for these items prior to their being
received.

That same knowledge imported to

respondent notice that the shipments must
be received before the check was valid.

By

the telephone calls respondent was notified

that a check was being sent conditionally,
that respondent could be a payee, and that
Allo had not yet performed.

It was also put

on notice that Allo was not paying its bills
and that appellant was trying to avoid paying
for his merchandise twice.

Notice of this

legal defense is the notice required in
70A-3-302, which nullifies

the concept that

respondent is a holder in due course and which
under 70A-3-304, gives notice of a voidable
obligation in whole or in part for failure
of the consideration upon which the check
was tendered.

Allo falsely represented that

the final shipment had been made,

(Tr. 51),

and it was the notification to respondent
that before the check was payable this shipment
was to be received which made

the check void-

able at the election of the maker and constituted
notice to the respondent that the legal shelter
afforded a holder in due course would not
become respondent's legal asylum.
-15-

POINT II.
RESPONDENT WAS PUT ON NOTICE
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE CHECK AND THE
DEFENSE TO ITS PAYMENT
The "due diligence" required of the
claimant in 70A-l-201 (27) as to the notice
received required the respondent to determine
that the check had not been cancelled because
of Allo's failure to comply with shipment of
promised items for which the check was payment and of which respondent had been notified.
This same burden is expressed in 70A-3-307,
U.C.A., 1953:
" ( 3) After it is shown that a defense
exists a person claiming the rights of
a holder in due course has the burden
of establishing that he or some person
under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course."
There is a duty to inquire of the appellant as to the validity of the check when
notice has been

given as to the condition

upon which the check was tendered.
has the burden of

Appellant

showing a failure of that

condition and respondent must then show that
after "due diligence" it could not know of
a claim of avoidance, to present a valid defense.

Respondent waived right to further notice
and waived any interest in the matter in refusing
to become a payee thereon.
The principle carried in the requirement
of 70A-3-302 that respondent must take in
"good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned."
70A-l-201 (19) That honesty which would require
that the informed respondent return to the
maker, its informant, to determine the validity
of the instrument to which it became a purchaser
and to which it now claims to be a holder
in due course. Respondent failed entirely
to exercise good faith in performing under
business standards to become a holder in due
course.

These reasonable commercial standards

become the axis of the decision under the New
York Commercial Code in Potter Bank
Co. v. Massey,

& Trust

11 Misc. 2d 523, 171 N. Y. S.

2d 27 (1958) The Court held that the claimant's
failure to make further inquiry would indicate
a deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge
being of a belief or fear that an investigation

would disclose a vice in the transaction and
prevent the protection of a holder in due
course.

This principal of good faith broadens

the prior law as to inquiry by the holder
to not only the actual knowledge required
by the previous Utah law but to include good
faith in exercising sound commercial standards
before respondent could claim to be a holder
in due course. Respondent refrained from such
inquiry and is attempting to trap appellant,
relying only on the irrelevant inquiry of
the bank whether there were funds in the account.

70A-3-307 (3)
POINT III. RESPONDENT IS NOT A "HOLDER IN
DUE COURSE."
The respondent made no effort to determine
from the maker the validity of the check.
Yet by telephone they had been notified

that

the condition as to payment was the receipt
of the merchandise and assurred appellant
that no further notification was necessary for
they had been paid in full.

In First Pennsylvania

Bank & Trust Co. v. DeLise, 168 Pa. Super
~oA

14?

A.

2d 401. these same provisions

of the Commercial Code were considered.
Defendants purchased a home improvement contract
and signed a note.

The note was discounted

to the bank which claimed to be a holder in
due course.

The bank had received a telephone

call from the defendants prior to the discounting
of the note at the bank claiming that the
work was not finished satisfactorily as of
that time.

The court held for defendants.

The defendants contended that they notified
plaintiff that they would not pay the note
for failure to fulfill the contract or until
the contract was fulfilled.
The court held that notice was sufficient
to shift the burden upon persons claiming
rights of holder in due course "where the
makers of a negotiable instrument testify
that

it was fraudulently executed and used

for a purpose not intended, a breach of faith
is sufficiently established to require the
endorsee to assume the burden of proving that
he is a holder in due course."
-19-

The telephone

conversation put the claimants on notice that
a defense may exist and that notice took the
plaintiff out of the protection of the legal
holder in due course putting it on notice
and shifting the burden to it to show that
in fact it exercised due diligence in inquiry
in order to be found a holder in due course.
Norman v. World Wide Distributors,
Inc.

202 Pa. Super, 193 A. 3d 115 (1963) involves

a "referral sales contract" and upon the principle of the Commercial Code required:
"He who seeks protection as a holder
in due course must have dealt fairly
and honestly in acquiring the instrument as to the rights of prior parties,
and where circumstances are such as to
justify the conclusion that the failure
to make inquiry arose from a suspicion
the inquiry would disclose a vice or
default in the title, the person is not
a holder in due course."
And further held, when a defense appears to
be meritorious the burden of showing it was
a holder in due course is on he one claiming
to be such.
The holder and respondent herein had
-20-

knowledge of circumstances which should have
caused it to inquire concerning the payee's
method of obtaining the check.

Respondent

had no interest in notice of defense stating
it was paid in full and did not want its name
included on the check further stating that if
any question arose it would call appellant.
Again, there is basis to determine that
respondent herein had reason to know that
there existed circumstances which would have
made the whole transaction with Allo voidable
and the check without validity.
70A-l-201 (25)
(25)
when
(a)
(b)

(c)

U.C.A., 1953

A person has 'notice' of a fact
he has actual knowledge of it; or
he has received a notice or
notification of it; or
from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time
in question he has reason to know
that it exists."

In Peoples Bank of Aurora Colorado
v. Haar, (Okla, 1966) 421 P 2d 817, plaintiff
was presented two checks drawn by defendant
to Western Aircraft Leasing.
-21-

The bank called drawee bank and then
cashed them allowing immediate credit on the
checks.

Defendant became concerned that he

would not get the interest in Western Aircraft
Leasing which he purchased and so stopped
payment.

The bank claimed to be a holder

in due course under the Oklahoma Commercial
Code.

The case was remanded upon the claimed

defense that the bank had not taken in good
faith in failng to ascertain the consideration
for the checks.
"The evidence did not show clearly
what his agreement was with the payees,
but it did indicate the possibility
of a defense as between the defendant
and the payees.
This is all that is
required by the law to place upon the
plaintiff the burden of proving that
it was in good faith and had no
knowledge of the defense."
Budget Charge Accounts v. Mullaney,
187 Pa. Super 190, 144 A. 2d 438 (1958).

The

Court found that negotiation of a note before
installation of the appliance pursuant to the
underlying contract "might well raise a jury
question as to whether the negotiation was for
-22-

the purpose of cutting off the defense of
fraud in the inception and so affecting the
good faith of the holder 11

•

If so, the

plaintiff could not prove that it is a holder
in due course "without notice that [the note]
is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of
any person.

11

Therefore, the maker was

permitted to open the judgment.
"The burden of proving that an
instrument is taken in good faith and
without knowledge of a defense is
placed upon a party claiming to be a
holder in due course after the adverse
party introduces evidence indicating
the possibility of a defense to the
instrument as between the payer and
payee." Peoples Bank of Aurora, Colorado v. Haar, 421 P 2d 817, supra.
(Syllabus of the Court)
What the respondent has shown is that
it is a holder of the appellant's check.

It

has not carried its burden further to show
that it is a holder "for value", "in good
faith" or "without notice." 70A-3-302 U.C.A.
~953

Having failed to comply with either

of these requirements respondent cannot be
heard to claim the protection of a holder

in due course.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant gave legal notice to respondent
that the check was tendered on condition
precedent to validity and thus "voidable"
upon failure of that consideration.

Respondent

did not put forth "due diligenceL to determine
its rights as a holder nor did it desire
further notice of defense but sought to avoid
knowledge of it.

Respondent failed to carry

its burden that as a holder it took "for value",
"in good faith" and "without notice 11

•

It

was error to grant the Motion for Judgment
and the judgment should be reversed.
RICHARDS, BIRD, HART & KUMP
Attorneys for Appellants
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